Takeshi Sakade, The British Aircraft Industry and American-led Globalisation 1943-1982 (Routledge, 2022)

Sakade challenges the narrative that the focus of British manufacturing went "from Empire to Europe" and argues rather that, following the Second World War, the key relationship was in fact trans-Atlantic. There is a commonly accepted belief that, during the twentieth century, British manufacturing declined irreparably, that Britain lost its industrial hegemony. But this is too simplistic. In fact, in the decades after 1945, Britain staked out a new role for itself as a key participant in a US-led process of globalisation. Far from becoming merely a European player, the UK actually managed to preserve a key share in a global market, and the British defence industry was, to a large extent, successfully rehabilitated. Sakade returns to the original scholarly parameters of the decline controversy, and especially questions around post-war decline in the fields of high technology and the national defence industrial base. Using the case of the strategically critical military and civil aircraft industry, he argues that British industry remained relatively robust. A valuable read for historians of British aviation and more widely of 20th century British Industry.

Part I. The Post-War British Aircraft Industry, 1943-1964

The conventional narrative of British history during the immediate post-war period is one of unmistakeable and ineluctable decline. The first section of the book re-examines this narrative through an analysis of the British aircraft industry during the two decades after the Second World War. To be sure, and in keeping with the conventional narrative, the British aircraft industry did indeed seem to be suffering reverses on every front during this period. And yet, a single British aeroengine maker (Rolls-Royce) was quietly making a case for itself as the principal supplier to both American and European airliners. Ultimately, part I shows how the seeds of Britain’s future role as a key player in an American-led process of globalisation were sown during the two, apparently bleak decades after World War II.

Chapter 1. The origins of Anglo-American production collaboration in the first jet-age (1943-56)

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This chapter traces British aircraft industrial policy from the closing years of the Second World War to the short-lived Eden government of 1955-57. During this period, Britain attempted to maintain and even extend its independent military aircraft industry. The historian Correlli Barnet has described this enterprise as a “neo-Edwardian dream”, and “technological overstretch”. In fact, however, Britain’s attempted preservation of independent aircraft production later provided the basis for an expanded British aircraft industry. To be sure, Britain’s attempt to take on American airliners through the production of the jet-powered Comet and Viscount was doomed to failure. From 1955, US airliners (such as the Boeing 707 and Douglas DC8) regained competitive superiority. And yet, by pragmatically agreeing to power the Boeing 707, Rolls-Royce was able to gain access to the world market and sow the seeds for a future, vital British role.

Chapter 2. Sandy’s Defence White Paper and the Rationalisation of the British Aircraft Industry, 1957–60

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As chapter 1 showed, the British aircraft industry had run into severe difficulties by the mid-1950s. By the end of the decade, these problems had only deepened. They derived partly from growing US dominance in the international civil aviation industry, but also from a reduction of government procurement of military manned aircraft due to the development of missiles. How did Harold Macmillan’s government attempt to overcome these difficulties? This chapter shows how Aubrey Jones, the British Minister of Supply, reorganised and rationalised the domestic aircraft industry. Duncan Sandys also introduced government launch aid in order to boost British military and civil projects (the TSR2 and VC10). Through these projects, the Macmillan government aimed to rebuild the aircraft industry with a view to the 1960s. This constituted a concerted attempt to maintain an independent defence industrial base for the British Empire, even in the wake of the Suez Crisis.

Chapter 3. BOAC’s Financial Crisis and the End of the “Fly British” Policy, 1963–66

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This chapter examines the end of the “Fly British” policy, under which British airlines had been obliged to purchase domestically produced aircraft. From 1962 to 1963, the BOAC sustained heavy losses on the North Atlantic route due to stiff competition from Pan American Airways. The British government, concerned about the condition of the domestic aircraft industry, continued to urge the BOAC to purchase domestically produced aircraft. However, the government also hinted at a possible future British purchase of American airlines. This was fully realised when the BOAC, in ordering a fleet of next-generation long-haul wide-body airliners, chose the Boeing 747. Britain was effectively forced to withdraw from the manufacture of long-haul aircraft. The BOAC improved its management through the use of American airliners and the liquidation of traditional ‘imperial obligations’, such as operating Empire routes and the ‘Fly British’ policy. But this came at a significant cost to British manufacturing.

Part II. The British Dilemma. 1964-1969

By the mid-1960s, British officials – including key figures in the aircraft industry – had largely awoken from the “neo-Edwardian dream” of independence and continued world-power status that had to some extent underpinned the policies of the 1950s. The British aircraft industry, it seemed, could not go it alone – it needed partners. But to which side of the Atlantic should London look? Part II shows how the mid-1960s constituted a period of crisis and uncertainty for the British aircraft industry. As the dream of independence melted away, British officials of this period were confronted with an existential question. Would the domestic aircraft industry be fully integrated into a burgeoning European aerospace sector in competition with the United States? Or would Britain come to function as a junior – but favored and indispensable – partner of the Americans?

Chapter 4. The Cancellation of Britain’s Top Projects, 1963–65

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Between February and April 1965, Harold Wilson’s Labour government took a series of fateful decisions which constituted a decisive turning point in the post-war history of the British aircraft industry. For predominantly financial reasons, three prominent military programmes were dramatically cancelled, and British officials decided instead to purchase American aircraft. This gave rise to considerable public shock in Britain, for it signalled an end to Britain’s independent aircraft development projects. However, as part of the negotiations over the purchase of the F111, US and British officials agreed that the Department of Defence would no longer apply the Buy American Policy in the case of British military products. This agreement enabled Rolls-Royce to compete in the American market on the same terms as US manufacturers. Britain had abandoned the development of the most sophisticated fighter but, in return, the British aero-engine sector had gained entry into the lucrative US market.

Chapter 5. The Politics Behind the Plowden Doctrine: European and American Alternatives for the British Aircraft Industry

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The effective end of the UK’s independent aircraft projects in the mid-1960s left British officials searching for collaboration partners. This task was largely delegated to the Plowden Committee, which is the main focus of this chapter. The British were intensely conflicted about the direction that international collaboration might take. The minutes of Plowden Committee meetings reveal a preference for France as a partner. Several influential officials, however, pressed instead for the “American option”, mainly because of the sheer size of the US military market. The Committee’s concluding report essentially designated any ambition toward an independent European policy as little more than a bargaining chip to be used in British-US negotiations. It is thus little surprise that, despite the Committee’s recommendations, the British aircraft industry thereafter initiated enhanced Anglo–American and, to a lesser degree, Anglo-German collaboration. French ambitions toward a genuinely independent European defence industrial sector were increasingly marginalised.

Chapter 6. The “European Technological Community” and the Anglo-German MRCA project, 1966–69

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Toward the end of the 1960s, the Wilson government’s focus in terms of European military collaboration began to shift from France toward Germany. This chapter examines this shift. It proceeds through an examination of critical negotiations around defence-industrial planning which took place toward the end of the 1960s between the US, the UK, France and West Germany. Particular focus is laid on questions around German rearmament, the development of a nascent West German aerospace industry, and the severe budgetary problems entailed by maintaining the British Army on the Rhine. A key outcome of these negotiations was the initiation of the Anglo-German Tornado fighter. The UK also altered its offsetting policy regarding the stationing costs of the BAOR, which in future would be paid for by German purchases of UK military goods. All of this facilitated enhanced Anglo-German collaboration in advanced technology sectors – and further marginalised the increasingly recalcitrant French.

Part III. European cooperative airliner projects and Anglo–American Industrial Collaboration, 1968-1982.

By the 1980s, the rehabilitation of the British aircraft industry from the acute crisis of the post-war years was largely complete. The 1970s was a crucial decade in this process of resurgence. Part III examines the British government’s aviation-industrial strategy (airframe, aero-engine and airlines) in relation to Continental Europe and the United States during this period. It shows how the British uncomfortably – but, ultimately, with some success – attempted to ride the “two horses” of deepened European collaboration and enhanced industrial entanglement with the Americans. By the mid-1980s, Rolls-Royce had emerged as an unlikely member of the “Big Three” aero-engine producers along with Pratt & Whitney and GE – a spectacular success for a non-American manufacturer.

Chapter 7. The second jet age and the bankruptcy of Rolls-Royce, 1967–71

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The late 1960s saw intensifying competition in the production of wide-body airliners in both the airframe and aero-engine sectors. This period was also marked by extensive conflict and adjustment in the industrial policies of the US, British, French and German governments. In these burgeoning conflicts, the British once again found themselves in a basically conflicted position. They continued to co-operate with the French and Germans on the European Airbus Consortium. This constituted a clear attempt to break the monopoly on wide-body airliners operated by US manufacturers. At the same time, however, the British also aimed to power the American-produced Lockheed TriStar with a Rolls-Royce RB211 engine. In 1971, the escalating developmental costs of this engine tipped Rolls-Royce into bankruptcy. Only a last-minute intervention by the Nixon Administration and the Heath Government saved the British manufacturer.

Chapter 8. Trapped in a Loveless Marriage: The Anglo-French Concorde crisis of 1974

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In the two decades after 1945, a supersonic transport (SST) began to emerge. It promised to revolutionise air travel. In 1962, Britain and France concluded a treaty which launched both on the path of developing the SST-based Concorde. This increasingly became a symbol of an Anglo–French partnership and Europe’s technological superiority over the United States. By 1974, however, Britain’s Labour government could find little enthusiasm for the Concorde project. The French, however, refused to waver from trying to accomplish their dream. Like the European monarchs of the past, British and French officials found themselves trapped in a “loveless marriage of convenience”.

Chapter 9. Playing a Double Game: The British aircraft industry in the third jet age

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By the late 1970s, the Callaghan government was vying to power the next generation Boeing airliner with a Rolls-Royce engine. From the British point of view, the rise of European Airbus created a favourable climate for negotiation. Indeed, BAe’s attempt to re-enter the Airbus Consortium was viewed by the Callaghan cabinet primarily as leverage to strengthen Britain’s negotiating position with the Americans. Britain was once more in the familiar position of “riding two horses” – one European, one American. In fact, Rolls-Royce’s strategy of powering American Boeing airliners had a considerable impact on the company’s commercial success going into the twenty-first century. Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, the Trent series (derived type of RB211) powered both American aeroplanes and Airbus airframes. This success earmarked Rolls-Royce’s emergence as one of the Big Three aero-engine producers along with American Pratt & Whitney and GE.

Conclusion

The main reason for the British victory in the Falklands war of 1982 was – from the perspective of military hardware – the naval task force’s cooperation with Royal Navy Sea Harriers and the RAF’s GR3 Harriers V/STOL fighter. These aircraft won the air battle against Argentina’s Mirage III and the Super Étendard. Indeed, at the outbreak of hostilities, two hundred and forty-seven Argentine fighters outnumbered the twenty British Sea Harriers by twelve to one. The British were required to draw on V/STOL Sea Harriers, the only available aircraft that could take off from the deck of an aircraft carrier far from the mainland. And yet they were victorious.